INTRODUCTION
It is uncontroversial that the legislatures with which we are familiar comprise a multitude of legislators. It is also uncontroversial that legislatures have or claim to have the moral power to change the law. When a legislature exercises this power, it does so through a combination of acts by its members. When that exercise of power is successful, it has an effect on our legal rights and duties.
1 During the legislative process, legislators form an intention that a specific statute be or not be enacted. This, too, seems to be rather uncontroversial. What has proven a lot more controversial is whether that intention and the various other intentions that legislators entertain in the course of the legislative process determine the statute's effect on our rights and duties, and, if so, how.
In recent decades there has been a revival of jurisprudential research in such issues. On the main, this phenomenon has been driven by two factors. First, legal philosophers have once again begun to ask why and under what conditions the legislature can make a difference to the law. Whereas the function of legislatures has been a traditional object of study for political scientists and constitutional lawyers, it was for a long time assumed that the theory of law can do without paying close attention to them. (London, Methuen, 1970) .
of law could presumably focus on the finished product, the statute that was eventually enacted.
3 Political science's iconoclastic approach to the subject probably corroborated this attitude of distancing. 4 Things have now changed, as contemporary democratic theory has put the deliberative and legitimating potential of legislative bodies front and centre. 5 The second factor that has brought legislatures back into the limelight is the increased traffic between legal theory and the philosophy of language. 6 That is not to say that legal theory had ignored the philosophy of language in the past. After all, language plays a salient role in legal practice. Unsurprisingly, then, as the philosophy of language made strides in recent years, especially in the pragmatics of communication, legal philosophy sought to keep pace. This development is thought to hold special appeal for those who study the legislature. The utterances of the legislature may not be the only jurisprudentially important thing about it, but, unlike the utterances of a court, they are commonly understood to possess a canonical status, making the statutory text a focal point of legal interpretation. Thus many scholars maintain that the general study of language can help us resolve some of the difficulties we encounter in assigning meaning to statutes. After briefly outlining Ekins' main claims I am going to put pressure on one of the connections that undergird his project, that between language and the law.
LEGISLATING TOGETHER
As mentioned above, legal philosophy was for long inimical to the notion of legislative intent, and probably this stance still sets the tone. Hence, it is only natural that Ekins' positive proposal proceeds dialectically from its confrontation with the critics of legislative intent. Legislative procedure commonly institutes a division of labour, whose outcome legislators can recognize as their collective decision by virtue of their commitment to the procedure. In turn, the procedure is supposed to facilitate that the collective decision will be the outcome of reasoned deliberation.
The defect in the reasoning of the sceptics is that they presuppose an aggregative or summative conception of legislative intent. If you think that legislative intent is an aggregate of the intentions of individual legislators, you will be drawn to scepticism.
There is no reason to expect that a sufficiently determinate common denominator can be found in such a large and diverse group. Scepticism also chimes with empirical findings about the extent to which individual legislators are informed and care about the bills that are put to their vote. This is why some sceptics have instead focused on the intentions of a subsection of -especially consequential -legislators, say the sponsors of a bill or the majority that voted for it. Surely, we are more likely to find commonality of purpose among them than among the legislature as a whole. Ekins' strategy obviates the need for this manoeuvre. If a bill's sponsors play a crucial part in the law-making process, it is because they are assigned that part by the master plan that underpins the function of the legislature. So legislators need not be of one mind when they are deciding on a piece of legislation. All that is necessary is that they intend to act together in accordance with the master plan.
The second front on which Ekins defends legislative intent is against textualists.
Textualists advocate that statutes should be interpreted according to what they call the 'plain meaning' of the words of the statute. By this they often mean their literal meaning. Ekins objects that the plain meaning is in no way a more basic determinant of a statute's meaning.
What is basic, he insists, is that the enactment of a statute is a communicative act. Drawing on work done by Stephen Neale, Scott Soames and others in the philosophy of language, Ekins contends that legislatures, just like language users, communicate by employing semantic as well as pragmatic means, relying -crucially -on context and shared understandings between them and their audience. As a result, much of what they assert through the enactment of a statute goes beyond or qualifies the semantic content borne by the words they use. So, although it makes sense to distinguish semantic content for analytical purposes, it is mistaken to attribute to it any primacy in statutory interpretation. A good interpreter will also attend to those further parameters.
The two sets of claims Ekins advances are mutually supportive. On the one hand, the argument against scepticism establishes the existence of the object of study, namely the collective intent of the legislature, which the argument against textualism presupposes.
Conversely, while the latter argument licenses recourse to context for ascertaining the meaning of a statute, this recourse is facilitated by the exploration of legislative process undertaken as part of the former argument. Surely, we can find out a lot about the context of law reform from the legislative process (ministerial statements, legislative debate, etc). And in order to do this effectively, we need to understand how the legislative process enables and structures the joint activity of the legislature. What is the character of Dworkin's scepticism about legislative intent? On one reading, which Ekins seems to share, it is metaphysical. Dworkin argues that there are many choices that we would have to make to construct the intention of the legislature from a set of historical facts, choices between different psychological states that different sets of legislators entertained during the legislative process, their abstract and concrete intentions regarding the interpretation of the statute they enacted, and so on. However, there is no 'shared concept of intention', 9 no 'legal linguistic convention', 10 which will govern these choices. Under these circumstances, we have to conclude that legislative intent does not exist. 11 In this picture, moral values are a deus ex machina that we invoke to fill the void. What we would seek in vain as a matter of historical fact we turn into a question about which imputation of intent would be morally appealing. In a passage on constitutional interpretation that seems to encourage this reading, Dworkin warns against supposing that the intention of the Framers is 'some complex psychological fact locked in history waiting to be winkled out from old pamphlets and letters and proceedings. But this is a serious common mistake, because there is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle.
THE AUTHORITY OF LEGISLATION AND THE CONTENT OF THE LAW
There is only some such thing waiting to be invented'. For instance, it could be said that democracy furnishes a reason for paying close attention to those stages of the decision-making process that possess high deliberative credentials and use the debate at those stages as an interpretive tool.
Democracy is just one of the candidate principles that may play a role in determining the impact of a legislative decision on our legal obligations. There are others.
Crucially, there are those principles that set substantive limits to what the legislature may do.
For instance, Dworkin has famously argued that a legal obligation exists only if having it satisfies the demands of political integrity, which provides that all citizens must be treated according to the same conception of equal concern and respect. Thus, the fact that a legislative decision flouts integrity undercuts its effect on the law, no matter what legislators thought or intended. Besides, Dworkin's account gives us no reason to view legislative decisions in isolation. 14 It does not suppose 'a fixed moment when the statute was spoken, 13 You may think that there are other considerations, which make it the case that the decisions of a nondemocratic legislature can also change our legal obligations. So, for instance, Ekins does not preclude that '[i]n communities that would otherwise lack the rule of law, it is…reasonable to authorize one person to legislate, to be a prince' (144). Moreover, you may think that democracy performs at best a secondary role in justifying the authority of even representative law-making institutions. These are substantive moral judgments that do not affect my argument. I mention democracy solely to give the general flavour of the way moral values ground legal obligations on the Dworkinian story. Ekins includes a very interesting defence of the authority of democratically elected, multi-member legislative assemblies in chapter 6. 14 By contrast, as we shall see below, Ekins thinks that, when the legislature acts as it was supposed to, it repeals or introduces into the law the propositions that it had intended to repeal or introduce. For him, then, we can study this effect of legislative decisions on our legal rights and duties independently of any further effects they may have, perhaps in combination with the decisions of other bodies. This is the position that Dworkin rejects.
when it acquired all the meaning it ever has'. (247). Note that this is far from a peripheral aspect of Ekins' project. His entire analysis is geared towards constructing a conception of legislative intent that can help us determine the meaning of a statute, by which we cannot but mean its legal meaning. In turn, its legal meaning is nothing other than its effect on the content of the law, the legal propositions that it 'repeals or introduces'.
As stated earlier, everybody agrees that statutes typically have an effect on the content of the law. It is debatable, though, whether they do so in the way presupposed by
Ekins. That legislatures can form group intentions and that they intend to legislate, even if true, does not settle the matter. This is so for two reasons. First, we cannot exclude the possibility that, when the legislature intends to legislate, it has a relatively modest intention, that is, merely to contribute to the content of the law, knowing full well that the effect of this contribution is subject to further considerations, like the moral ones that Dworkin puts in the driving seat. According to this possibility, the legislature does not have the further stronger intention to repeal or introduce legal propositions by say-so. Second, assuming that the legislature's intentions are not modest, why should they themselves determine what effect they have on the law? 22 Ekins writes that they are 'at least closely relevant to the legal changes the act should be understood to introduce' (11). But there must be an explanation that bestows on them this role. Many morally important -including some legalconsequences are independent of anyone's intentions, so it takes further argument to show that in this particular case our obligations closely track the intentions of the legislature. In addition, it is highly unlikely that this explanation can be found in the philosophy of language. No doubt, when legislators enact a statute, they engage in a form of communication. But the enactment of a statute affects our rights and duties not because it is an act of communication but because it is an exercise of authority.
Thus, to defend explanatory directness we must consult political philosophy and the theory of practical reason. There is no shortage of views that take this tack. subjects have a reason to treat that view as binding. 23 Similarly, David Enoch proposes that practical authorities could be understood to create a special kind of reason which he labels robust. Robust reasons have the following structure: In the relationship between authority and subject, the authority intends to give the subject a reason to φ and communicates this intention to her, intending that the subject recognizes this intention and that the reason will depend in an appropriate way on that recognition. In these and other similar circumstances robust reasons are created 'merely by the very forming of the intention to give a reason'.
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Ekins does not explicitly align himself with any such view, but the same spirit animates his argument. As already discussed, it proceeds from an analysis of the concept of legislating. Legislating, he argues, is meant to be a rational activity. Ideally, it is guided by judgments about what is good for society and about the means to achieve it. These judgments are governed by right reason. Ekins contends that the legislature has authority insofar as it engages in this form of rational activity. Its authority consists in enacting into law the regulatory scheme it has judged follows from right reason.
However, the evidence offered falls short of establishing the explanatory direct link Ekins draws between legislative action and legal authority. All it shows is that the intention of the legislature, if there is such a thing, is to exercise a legal power understood in a certain way. What it does not show is that the change in the law effected by a statute is the meaning of the proposition asserted by the legislature in enacting it. We can accept that the legislature's contribution to the content of the law is a reasoned choice for the promotion of the common good rather than a mere text and still doubt that we can calculate its legal meaning solely by interpreting what it meant to convey. We have noted two possibilities that fuel this doubt. To begin with, as the legislature is not the only body that speaks on law's behalf, it seems plausible to suggest that, in order to ascertain its contribution to the law, we ought to examine the interplay between the legislature and the other main players in the constitutional order. The latter may have the power to alter or temper the impact of a statute. 1933-1592.2012.00610.x legislative decision that violates these limits has no effect on the law, regardless of how reasoned it is. Here, again, the contribution of the legislative decision to the content of the law is not exclusively a function of what the legislature intended.
If you subscribe to Dworkin's brand of anti-positivism, you will be attracted to both of these possibilities. To decide between the Dworkinian view and Ekins', you will have to engage head-long with philosophical debates about the nature and determinants of legal obligation. Ekins does not win by default.
MORALITY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In the previous section I contrasted two accounts of the connection between legislative utterances and the content of the law. However, it might seem to some that this contrast is rather abstract and disconnected from the practical concerns of those who invoke and study legislative intent. Does it make any difference in statutory interpretation? I think it does. To show this, I shall use two illustrations. Notice, first, that the contrast sheds new light on Ekins' critique of textualism. Ekins argues against textualists using resources and insights borrowed from the philosophy of language. Dworkin's theory of law cuts across this dispute.
On Dworkin's theory, the truth or falsity of textualism ultimately rests on the moral case that can be made for it, and not solely on facts about language and communication. In fact, regardless of how it is presented by its advocates, textualism itself can be defended on moral grounds. In the circumstances of democratic politics, it can be said, the enactment of a statute is achieved in the midst of reasonable disagreement about moral issues. Hence, by interpreting the statute on the basis of the plain meaning of the enacted text, we are vindicating that achievement because arguably we insulate it from the controversy from which it emerged. Or maybe we are promoting the value of publicity or fair notice. Note that this construal of textualism makes no reference to the idea that the plain meaning of the words of the statute more accurately conveys legislative intent. Rather, it is based on moral considerations about how the legal effect of legislative decisions ought to be cashed out.
Needless to say, some of Ekins' careful arguments could also be understood to undercut the moral case for textualism. Perhaps they establish that the plain meaning is too indeterminate to serve the value of fair notice or the asserted meaning sufficiently public to perform the same task. It goes beyond the scope of this article to assess the merits of the arguments for and against textualism. By contrast, if we reject this belief, as Dworkin does, we do not need to rely on a morally beefed up notion of legislative intent. Instead, we can say that the bearing of a legislative decision on our rights and duties is checked by other principles of political morality. These operate independently of whether any legislator thought of them when enacting the statute or endorsed them. They operate just by virtue of the fact that they contribute to the appropriate moral case for the existence of a legal obligation. Consider the presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to human rights. Dworkin would say that it imposes a moral constraint on what rights and duties can flow from a statute, grounded solely in the importance of human rights principles as determinants of legal obligation (in this or that jurisdiction), rather than reflecting a dubious standing disposition of legislators, individually or collectively, to respect these principles. In turn, the power of Parliament to overturn the presumption through the use of clear and unambiguous language can be seen to be grounded in the (controversial) proposition that the value of democratic self-rule sometimes overrides human rights principles.
Besides, it is important to remember that such presumptions are typically employed by law-applying institutions such as courts in the course of interpreting primary legislation. They can thus be understood as a further obstacle to explanatory directness. They dramatize the possibility adumbrated above that, in order to determine the change in the law brought about by a piece of legislation, it is not enough to look at facts about the legislative process that led to its adoption but must take into account facts about other state institutions like courts as well as facts about what the legislature had decided in the past. 25 As Dworkin puts it, 'the history [the judge] interprets begins before a statute is enacted and continues to the moment when he must decide what it now declares'.
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CONCLUSION
The Nature of Legislative Intent is an in-depth study of legislatures that offers thoughtful solutions to age-old jurisprudential quandaries. It also puts much needed philosophical sophistication at the service of constitutional law and legal interpretation more generally.
This is a book driven by the insight that legislative intent is a concept connecting the inquiry about how legislatures are constituted, and how they act and speak, with the inquiry about how they change the law. But we must be mindful of the fact that the first inquiry is largely factual while the other normative. In order to bridge the two, as I have sought to show in this article, our accounts of legislative intent must attend to the role that the legislature plays within the broader legal order, the way in which it is meant to contribute to the law. At this level, we must factor into our account a wide range of considerations that arguably qualify the bearing of legislative decisions on the content of the law. We must also take a stand on questions regarding legal authority and the grounds of legal obligation. There, we will find yet more quandaries to solve. 
